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ABSTRACT  
 
The Swedish party system has been one of the world’s most stable, and anti-immigrant 
parties have been largely absent from the centre-stage of Swedish politics. It is thus peculiar 
that an anti-immigrant party, the Sweden Democrats (SD), made a dramatic breakthrough in 
the 2006 local elections, gaining representation in 144 out of 290 municipalities. The purpose 
of this article is to explain why the SD gained representation in almost half of the Swedish 
municipalities. Results indicate support for a supply-oriented argument: whether the SD ran 
with a formal ballot or not has a substantial and statistically significant effect on their 
probability of receiving representation even when a series of variables, suggested by 
previous research, is controlled for. The result has important ramifications, since it implies 
that no obvious socioeconomic factors, e.g. local ‘fertile grounds’, brought SDs success about. 
Rather, what decided its fate was whether or not the party had an organizational presence 
and actual candidates running for seats.  
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INTRODUCTION
1 
The Swedish party system has been one of the most stable in the world throughout the 
history of modern democracies. In fact, it has been somewhat of a textbook illustration of 
Lipset’s and Rokkan’s (1967) ‘freezing hypothesis’: the same five parties occupied all seats in 
the Swedish Parliament, the Riksdag between 1921 and 1988. However, after the 1988 election 
there has been some de-freezing at the national level. The Green Party gained representation 
in 1988, and even though it lost representation in 1991, the party made a comeback in 1994 
and have had seats ever since. The Christian Democrats and New Democracy entered the 
Riksdag in 1991. However, the populist New Democracy lost all representation in 1994. 
Subsequently the organization gradually dissolved (Westlind 1996), and today, it is fair to 
say that the party has seized to exist.2  
 
In light of populist, anti-immigrant party success in neighbouring countries such as Norway 
and Denmark – who share many of Sweden’s demographic and political characteristics – it is 
peculiar that anti-immigrant parties3 have had a hard time to establish themselves in Sweden 
(cf. Green-Pedersen & Krogstrup 2008; Green-Pedersen & Odmalm 2008; Art 2006; Rydgren 
2002; Fryklund & Peterson 1981).4 That being said, in 2006 the anti-immigrant Sweden 
Democrats (SD)5 made a remarkable breakthrough in local elections. The party gained 
representation in 144 out of 290 Swedish municipalities, a substantial increase compared to 
the 2002 elections, when it only gained seats in 29. In the Riksdag election, the party did not 
receive enough support to get above the threshold of 4 percent necessary to obtain 
                                                 
1 Thanks to Olof Palmes Minnesfond for partly financing this project, and to Erik Wångmar for assisting 
us with data collection. Also thanks to Niclas Berggren, Pieter Bevelander, Carl Dahlström and Henrik 
Oscarsson for valuable input. 
2 To demonstrate that New Democracy has vanished from the political limelight in Sweden, one can 
note that the party got six handwritten [sic!] votes in the 2006 election. 
3 Many researchers have dubbed these parties as ‘radical right wing’ parties. However, we agree with 
Fennema (1997) and Van der Brug and Fennema (2007) that such parties are more correctly 
categorized as ‘anti-immigrant’. They cannot be easily fitted into the left-right divide, and their only 
common denominator is their attempt to sell the anti-immigrant issue to the voters. 
4 New Democracy was undoubtedly populist, anti-immigrant and right-wing. However, they never 
succeeded in establishing themselves on the political scene, and organizationally, it would be hard to 
argue that they constituted a viable political party organization for more than one electoral period (i.e. 
1991–1994). 
5 Even before their modest success in 2002, the SD was mentioned as the ‘most important political 
party outside the national parliament’ (Larsson and Ekman 2001). The party was founded in 1988. To 
briefly give a feel for the party’s politics, one can note that it has intimate historical affiliations to 
outright racist and Nazi movements in Sweden. In fact, Larssons and Ekmans (2001) detailed mapping 
of the party’s origins leaves no doubt that those who founded the party in the late 1980s were deeply 
tapped into neo-Nazi networks (for example the notorious Bevara Sverige Svenskt [Keep Sweden Swedish] 
movement.    4 
representation. However, with 2.9 percent of the votes, it got entitled to financial support 
until the next election in 2010.  
 
Together with stronger finances, the attention the party subsequently received has spawned 
further success. When all other major parties report rapidly declining membership figures, 
the SD are on the rise. Allegedly, membership rose from 1.802 on January 1, 2006 to 2.913 on 
January 1, 2008, i.e. with 62 percent (SD-kuriren 14.1.2008). In addition, throughout the first 
half of 2008, many polls indicated that over four percent of Swedish voters would cast their 
votes on SD in national elections (cf. Svenska dagbladet 23.08.2008; Expressen 09.05.2008; 
Expressen 06.03.2008). If there was an election today, chances are that Sweden would get an 
anti-immigrant party in the Riksdag. 
 
Previous research has highlighted the relative absence of anti-immigrant and populist parties 
from the Swedish electoral arena.6  The SD breakthrough in the 2006 local elections thus 
deserves closer scrutiny. Firstly, precisely because anti-immigrant parties have had a hard 
time making their way into the Swedish electoral arena, the SD success is surprising and in 
demand of explanation. Secondly, since anti-immigrant party success challenges popular 
theoretical notions within political sociology (i.e. Lipset’s and Rokkan’s [1967] ‘freezing 
hypothesis’ and Inglehart’s [1977, 1990], postmaterialist ditto, [cf. Veugelers 1999]), we 
maintain that alternative theoretical tools must be employed to make the SD breakthrough in 
2006 comprehensible. Thirdly, because the SD made such a dramatic increase in support 
from one election (2002) to another (2006), the case is well suited for developing hypotheses 
regarding the electoral fates of new political parties. 
 
The purpose of this article is to answer why the SD gained representation in 144 out of 290 
municipalities in the 2006 local elections. We do this by complementing the dominating 
approaches in the field by outlining a supply-oriented argument. As it turns out, we 
demonstrate that our supply-oriented approach constitutes an important factor if one wants 
to understand the SD breakthrough in 2006, even when ‘usual suspects’-variables are 
controlled for.  
 
The article proceeds as follows. First, we present a review of the dominating perspectives on 
new party emergence and success in general, and anti-immigrant ditto in particular. Here, 
                                                 
6 From here on we simply call these parties ‘anti-immigrant parties’.   5 
we criticize previous research for overestimating the power of demand-oriented 
explanations, and conversely for underestimating the role played by anti-immigrant 
organizers and campaigners, i.e. those actually supplying anti-immigrant programs to the 
voters. Secondly, we present our supply-oriented argument, and formulate the theoretical 
expectations it implies. Thirdly, we empirically test how well our supply-oriented argument 
fares at explaining SD success in the 2006 election. Lastly, we conclude by summarizing, 
drawing out our main conclusions and briefly engaging with some alternative explanations 
we are not able to account for here. 
 
COMMON EXPLANATIONS AND THEIR LIMITATIONS 
Several individual studies have tried to explain the emergence of, and success for, new 
parties in general. A subgenre within this field has tried to do the same for anti-immigrant 
parties. Running the risk of treating the many nuances in the literature unfairly, we will 
nevertheless sort the dominating approaches in the literature into three main categories: 
 
  Institutional explanations 
  ‘Existing supply’ explanations 
  Demand-oriented explanations 
 
Institutional explanations generally relate to Duvergers (1954) ‘law’, which emphasizes that 
electoral systems have decisive effects on the structure for party competition, and hence on 
the composition of party systems (see also Sartori 1976). Electoral systems applying plurality 
rule in single-member districts are expected to tend towards the domination of two large 
parties, whereas proportional (PR) electoral systems will have a propensity of generating a 
larger number of parties. These expectations find support in empirical studies (e.g. Farrell 
1997; Lijphart 1994; Taagepera & Shugart 1989). Willey (1998) uses these instruments, and 
concludes that new parties are more likely to emerge in PR-systems with large districts, 
while PR-systems with small districts tend to have more stable party systems. In a similar 
vein, Bolin (2007) finds that electoral systems are important factors when explaining why 
new parties enter national parliaments. 
 
In line with this reasoning, several scholars have concluded that the degree of 
proportionality in the electoral system affects the fates of anti-immigrant parties (e.g. Golder   6 
2003). According to Jackman and Volpert (1996) high electoral thresholds, and low degrees of 
proportionality in the electoral system, dampen the prospects of anti-immigrant parties to 
gain representation, whereas more proportionality increases their possibilities. Furthermore, 
Arzheimer and Carter (2006: 423) maintain that the territorial organization of states – i.e. the 
degree of centralization – is another institutional variable that explains the long-term fate of 
anti-immigrant parties. More centralized political systems seem to decrease the likelihood of 
their success. 
 
But can such instruments be used to answer our particular research question, i.e. to explain 
why SD made their way into 144 out of 290 local councils in the 2006 local elections? It is 
important to note that institutional theories are first and foremost capable of explaining 
spatial variation at one point in time between political systems with different institutional 
configurations. However, longitudinal changes within the one and the same political system seem 
to escape the scope of inquiry of the institutional perspective. In order for this perspective to 
be able to explain why the SD made their breakthrough in the 2006 local elections, one would 
have to demonstrate that relevant institutions – e.g. rules regarding the electoral system – 
have undergone changes, so campaigning and working within a non-established party 
became less costly and/or more lucrative. However, no evidence supports such assertions. 
Although institutional perspectives have proven successful at explaining spatial variation, 
and the varying fates of new parties under different institutional settings, we conclude that 
these theories are not the most appropriate tools when it comes to answering the research 
question at hand. 
 
Theories emphasizing the failure of established parties, i.e. ‘existing supply’ explanations, are 
widespread when it comes to attempts to explain the fortunes of anti-immigrant parties. 
Katz’s and Mair’s (1995) description of the emergence of the cartel party probably represents 
the most famous version of this notion (cf. Blyth & Katz 2005). Cartelization of the 
established parties implies that they have distanced themselves from civil society, and 
subsequently lost touch with party members as well as voters. As a result, the gap between 
parties and their constituencies widens. According to Katz and Mair (1995: 24) this gap runs 
the risk of being filled by so called anti-system parties, such as anti-immigrant parties 
exploiting anti-immigrant sentiments (cf. Blyth & Katz 2005: 55). The established parties, 
thus, are on a potential loosing streak, and the secluded cartel of parties is continuously   7 
threatened by party entrepreneurs looking for new issues, not addressed by the cartel, to 
exploit.  
 
When explaining the emergence and success of anti-immigrant parties, it is hard to disregard 
explanations that refer to the premise that established parties, at least in some respect, are 
failing. This notion is hard to disregard because the primary argument on which it is based is 
so intuitive, i.e. that new parties emerge when established alternatives fail (e.g. Lawson & 
Merkl 1988; Hauss & Rayside 1978). The failure, or sheer unwillingness, of old organizations 
to change and adapt to new demands, opens up spaces between the established 
organizations. These spaces – in turn – may become exploitable sites for new organizations.  
 
However, at least two objections can be raised against what we here call the ‘existing 
supply’-approach. Firstly, since the explanation is so intuitive, it almost becomes 
tautological. If the party organizations already occupying the market for political parties are 
perfectly adaptive to changes in voter preferences, and do handle public resources in competent 
manner, there would be no incentives for individuals to form new parties or for the 
electorate to vote for non-established parties. Secondly, theories concerned with the failure of 
established parties are silent about the micro foundations of the purported explanation, for 
example concerning the motives of party entrepreneurs. Even if established parties fail (do 
not adapt to changing preferences, do not canalize public demands to operative political 
decisions, and do not handle public resources optimally), with the consequence that demands 
for new political parties arise in the electorate, there is still no good reason for individuals to 
invest money, time, energy and social status in the high cost (and often socially stigmatizing) 
project of forming a new anti-immigrant party. The free-rider problem appears (Olson 1971), 
and thus, in order to avoid functionalist reasoning, the proponents of this perspective need a 
theory that highlights the role of individuals organizing new parties. The failure of established 
parties cannot, by themselves, explain the emergence and success of new political parties, 
such as the SD. The failure of established parties must therefore be seen as a necessary, but 
not a sufficient, condition for a new anti-immigrant party to gain success.7  
 
What about demand-oriented explanations? When explaining the emergence and success of 
new parties in general, scholars typically relate to Inglehart’s (1990) studies on post-material 
                                                 
7 One of the few scholars who takes micro foundations seriously in this context, and truly remedies the 
neglects of the ’existing-supply’ perspective, is Hug (2001), who applies a game-theoretical approach 
to party emergence.   8 
values, i.e. the upsurge of demands for freedom, self-expression, and quality of life (cf. 
Kitschelt 1995; Harmel & Robertsson 1985).8 Explanations with this particular focus, 
however, often presuppose that value change in the electorate automatically generate parties 
based on post-materialist, and anti-authoritarian, values (i.e. neoliberal, environmentalist 
and/or feminist parties). These theories are terribly ill suited to explain the success of anti-
immigrant parties (e.g. Veugelers 1999). 
 
On the other hand, there are several demand-oriented explanations that are tailor-made to 
explain the fortunes of anti-immigrant parties. These typically focus on resentments, and 
frustrations among the voters (cf. Betz 1993). The emergence of social problems as a 
consequence of, for example, increasing immigration and rampant unemployment, have 
made many scholars believe that voters will be increasingly prone to make new, not seldom 
outright xenophobic, anti-liberal, anti-system and anti-immigrant demands (e.g. Coffé et al 
2007; Kestilä 2006; Jesuit & Mahler 2004; Golder 2003; Rydgren 2002; Lubbers et al 2002; 
Karapin 1998). Moreover, the dynamics of globalization and demands for welfare 
retrenchment have been considered to be a major source of frustration, and hence of new and 
potentially radical demands from frustrated segments of the electorate (Betz & Swank 2003).  
 
In empirical research, the independent variables of demand-oriented explanations are thus 
often associated with structural conditions and socio-economic factors of various sorts. 
Typically, the share of immigrants, crime- and unemployment rates and education levels are 
held to be ‘usual suspects’ believed to explain the differing fortunes of anti-immigrant 
parties (cf. Kestilä 2006).  As explanations to the success of new parties, however, they seem 
flawed. They cannot account for the relative failure or relative success of radical anti-
immigrant parties, at least not by themselves. As Rydgren (2002) points out, in the 1990s 
Sweden experienced both high levels of immigration and unemployment, without seeing 
any successful anti-immigrant parties. In fact, such demand-oriented variables fall short of 
explaining why the SD made their huge breakthrough in 2006, and not in 2002 or in 1998. In 
the 1990s, Sweden got larger shares of immigrants and the unemployment rates rose but the 
upswing of the SD occurred in 2006. There is no reason to believe that the demand for SD-
like policies in the electorate were significantly different at the 2006 election compared to 
previous ones (e.g. Demker 2004, 2005).  
                                                 
8 Inglehart has, to our knowledge, never explicitly analyzed party emergence or new party success, 
although a hypothesis along this line of reasoning is suggested in Inglehart and Flanagan (1987: 
1300f).   9 
 
What was different in 2006 was that there now was a viable supply of an anti-immigrant 
party to vote for in many of the municipalities, i.e. there was a product on display on the 
market for votes with a potential to attract dissatisfied voters, and there were actually local 
campaigns trying to sway voter preferences in an anti-immigrant direction. Consequently we 
maintain that demand-oriented variables should, at best, be seen as necessary conditions for 
anti-immigrant parties to gain representation. To gain de facto representation, however, there 
has to be such an organization in place, setting up formal ballots and actually running for 
election, so that the electorate has a de facto chance to vote for it in the first place. Thus, we 
strongly maintain that one needs to complement the demand-side explanation with a supply 
side ditto.9  
 
All in all, the demand-oriented explanation is narrowly focused on structural, socio-
economic, variables relating to different characteristics in the electorate. However, these 
explanations tend to ignore the supply-side of the story, i.e. the campaigners and movement 
organizers who de facto organize, and make the anti-immigrant parties available to the 
voters. Demand-oriented explanations are also limited, since they do not take into account 
that established political parties are able to control the political agenda and adapt to changing 
preferences in the electorate (e.g. Mair 1983). Lastly, demand-oriented explanations are sort 
of functionalist in the sense that they do not take into account that since political parties are 
producers of collective goods, groups demanding political parties face a collective action 
problem. Hence the free-rider problem appears, and reminds us that we should not expect 
every new political cleavage in the electorate to have its own political organization.  
 
Although some of the arguments within the institutional explanations, the ‘existing supply’ 
explanations and demand-oriented explanation are relevant, their respective shortcomings do not 
qualify them as theoretical points of departure for the empirical investigations required to 
answer our question, i.e. why SD gained representation in 144 out of 290 municipalities in 
the 2006 local elections. The causal mechanisms argued to be at work in these streams of 
literature will not take the centre stage in our own attempt to explain the success of SD.  
                                                 
9 Already in 2002 Rydgren implied precisely this, and wrote: ‘an upcoming protest party […], with 
sufficient appeal, might very well change this situation’, that is Sweden’s status as a country without 
influential anti-immigrant parties (Rydgren 2002: 46). Obviously, in retrospect, Rydgren seems to have 
been proven right. The mechanisms bringing this change about, nevertheless, are invisible through the 
lenses of a demand-oriented perspective, and needs to be complemented by a supply-oriented one.   10 
ANTI-IMMIGRANT PARTY SUCCESS:  
A SUPPLY-ORIENTED APPROACH 
A fictive example serves as a starting point for the formulation of our argument. Picture a 
society where there are 290 supermarkets. In these supermarkets, only seven brands of soft 
drinks have been on display in the cold counter throughout the years up to some year (say, 
t0). Ergo, not surprisingly, only these seven brands are sold – with varying degrees of 
popularity – to the customs in all supermarkets. At t1, however, a new soft drink producer 
decides to establish its brand, but does only have the financial resources to deliver it to, and 
advertise it, in 132 of the 290 supermarkets. Subsequently, after t1, between four and ten 
percent of the customers in these 132 supermarkets begin buying the new soft drink. In the 
remaining 158 ones the customers do not know about the new brand through advertisement, 
and are not even physically given a chance to buy it. Thus, the customers continue to buy 
one of the good old seven ones that always have been supplied in the remaining 158 
supermarkets.  
 
If we’d ask you to give your first best shot at explaining why four to ten percent buy the new 
brand in 132 of the 290 supermarkets, what would your answer be? If we are correct in our 
assumptions about how most people think about these things (that is, in a simple, 
straightforward manner) chances are that your answer would be something like: ‘Well, the 
new brand has its relative success because it constitutes a real alternative in 132 supermarkets, 
and not in the other 158.’ As far as simple and parsimonious explanations go, we think that 
they do not have to be more complicated than this. And, in line with Poppers (1992) credo, 
we think one ought to try to keep explanations as simple as they possible can. 
 
This brief example illustrates the thrust of our argument. We do not doubt the prerequisites 
drawn by the demand-oriented perspective. Needless to say, customer preferences are 
indeed often important. There most likely has to be some, real or potential, demand for anti-
immigrant parties in order for such parties to gain electoral success.10 In Sweden, like 
                                                 
10 We write ‘most likely’ because it is not self-evident that there has to be an ex ante demand for new 
political parties for them to succeed. There are reasons to believe that, for example, advertisements, 
campaigning by cajoling and persuading, and/or charismatic leaders can influence voter preferences. 
Two influential scholars – Schattschneider and Schumpeter – have made similar arguments when 
stressing politicians’ abilities to affect voter preferences. Schattschneider (1960: 66, 69, 102) developed 
the concept ‘mobilization of bias’ to underscore that social scientists ought not to analyze political 
parties as solely mirroring the political conflicts that may exist between social classes in a given 
society. Instead, political parties and politicians must be analyzed as active subjects with the ability to 
mould public opinion. Schumpeter (1976: 270), on his hand, used the concept ‘the manufactured will’   11 
elsewhere in contemporary Western Europe, there appears to be at least some kind of market 
for anti-immigrant programs. For example, in 2007, 23.3 percent of the Swedes reported that 
they would be willing to support a political program that restricts immigrants’ rights, and 30 
percent of them maintained that ethnic Swedes should take precedence over immigrants 
when allowances and jobs are distributed among Swedish inhabitants (Integrationsbarometern 
2007). However, as necessary as these prerequisites may be, we argue that they are not 
sufficient in order to understand why anti-immigrant parties emerge and gain electoral 
support. There must be an organization in place that supplies an anti-immigrant program 
and local campaigning for the demand for such politics to have electoral consequences. 
 
How is it possible to make our simple and intuitive supply-oriented argument researchable? 
How can we test if our approach provides an explanation to the SD breakthrough 2006? In 
the following, we make the case that what contributes to the explanation of SD-
representation in local councils after the 2006 is whether or not they ran with a formal ballot. 
Hence, we maintain that an important factor in the explanation of SD representation in a 
local council is that they actually had an organization in the municipality, and not that there 
is anything ‘socio-economic’ that distinguishes the municipalities where SD got 
representation from the ones where they did not gain seats.  
 
EXPLAINING THE SWEDEN DEMOCRATS’ SUCCESS IN 2006 
Does our theoretical story hold for empirical scrutiny? We want to examine whether the SD 
is more likely to reach council representation in those municipalities where they ran for 
election with a formal ballot, e.g. where they actually had a ballot with nominated 
candidates. Theoretically, running with a formal ballot should increase the probability for 
electoral success because it is:  
 
  A signal to the voters that there is a de facto supply of physical SD candidates ready to 
take place in local councils in the municipality 
  A proxy for whether or not the SD had a formal organization in place locally actually 
campaigning and actively trying to affect voter preferences.  
 
                                                                                                                                                         
to capture a related phenomenon, i.e. that political parties actively can affect and mould the public 
opinion.    12 
In the 2006 elections, the SD ran with formal ballots in 132 out of 290 municipalities. The 
party gained representation in 79 percent of them. At first glance, this lends initial support to 
our proposed argument. Among the municipalities where the SD ran with a ballot without 
nominated candidates, they only gained seats in 25 percent of them. This suggests that 
running with a formal ballot increases the probability that the SD acquires representation in 
the municipal councils.  
 
Still – at least this is what advocates of the demand-oriented perspective would lead us to 
believe – it could well be the case that the SD only chooses to run with a formal ballot in 
municipalities where the demand for an anti-immigrant party is more profound than 
elsewhere. Consequently one would suspect that, after all, it is resentments among large 
segments of the electorate that causes anti-immigrant parties to run with a ballot. Therefore, 
if the demand-oriented perspective is right, one would find that representatives of the SD 
decide to run with formal ballots where demand for anti-immigrant policies is believed to be 
high.  
 
We therefore obviously need to control for proxies for anti-immigrant demand, i.e. local 
contextual socioeconomic factors that, according to previous research, increases the 
probability of success for anti-immigrant parties. If we perform such a test, do we still find 
that a formal ballot increases the likelihood of SD receiving council representation? The 
purely demand-oriented theories suggest that once we control for these factors, the effect of 
SD running with a formal ballot would if not disappear, at least diminish considerably.  
 
In order to carry out the task at hand we estimate a statistical model using data from the 
Swedish municipal elections in 2006. Hence, the units of analysis are Swedish municipalities. 
There are several reasons why municipalities are well suited for this kind of analysis. Since 
the electoral system is the same in all municipalities, and the legal framework is identical in 
other relevant respects as well, we keep the most interesting institutional aspects constant. 
Moreover, Swedish municipalities are homogeneous in other theoretically relevant aspects, 
most importantly, perhaps, when it comes to political culture, at least compared to 
differences between nations. This should further aid us to isolate the effect of running with a 
formal ballot.  
   13 
The dependent variable in our model is whether the SD reached council representation or 
not, since it is actual political representation we are interested in. We argue that this is the most 
interesting, politically relevant variable, since it is the actual presence of the SD in local 
councils that has potential to have actual political implications. 11 The reference category for 
‘The SD ran with a formal ballot’ is that they did not run with a formal ballot, and the 
variable is based on information provided by the Election Authority in Sweden 
(Valmyndigheten). Since the dependent variable is dichotomous, the relationship between the 
dependent variable and the independent variables is not linear, and therefore logistic 
regression is applied.  
 
The probability that SD gains municipal representation is thus assumed to be a function of 
the variables in the model. However, the non-linear relationship between the independent 
and dependent variables makes it somewhat more difficult to interpret the estimates. This is 
due to the fact that the effect of a change in one independent variable on the outcome 
probability depends on the levels of all other independent variables. Yet, this is of lesser 
concern in this case since we are primarily interested in the effect of one independent 
variable, namely the effect of running with a formal ballot (1=yes, 0=no). The other 
independent variables are mainly included in the model in order to control for other 
potential causes for the success of the SD. The rationale is to expose our supply-oriented 
argument to a test by including some variables that have been deemed important in previous 
studies.  
 
In the literature review above, we briefly outlined the logic behind the demand-oriented 
perspective. Which variables, then, have been discussed in previous explanations of anti-
immigrant party success? 
 
  Firstly, the share of immigrants in a given society is commonly seen as an important 
explanatory variable (Arzheimer & Carter 2006; Rydgren 2002; Kitschelt 1995). The share of 
the population born outside the Nordic countries is therefore included as a control variable. 
Information about country of birth comes from the Swedish population register (Statistics 
Sweden) and is based on the population 18 years and older in 2006. 
                                                 
11 However, our choice of this dependent variable does not acquit us from also checking if our 
argument has bearing on the continuous variable ‘percentage of votes for the SD in the 2006 elections’. 
As illustrated by table 2 in the appendix, our argument fairs quite well here as well.   14 
  Secondly, a society’s crime rate has typically been seen as a factor fostering success of anti-
immigrant parties, since these often campaign on issues such as ‘safer neighbourhoods’. 
Furthermore, they often frame the problem of crime as an issue solely caused by immigrants. 
Although this explanation is most often put forward by public commentators rather than in 
scholarly work, it has been mentioned in academic studies as well (cf. Smith 2004, Bauer et al 
2000). Therefore, ‘number of reported crimes per 1000 inhabitants’ is included in the model. 
  Thirdly, formal education is thought to be a pertinent factor influencing the willingness to 
vote for anti-immigrant parties (Kitschelt 1995). The so-called ‘losers of modernity’ – i.e. 
people without higher education, which have a hard time competing on an increasingly 
globalized labour market – are hypothesized to be more likely to support such parties than 
others (Kestilä 2006; Betz & Immerfall 1998). Thus, lack of higher education is included as a 
control variable. The operationalization is based on the share of the population with post-
secondary education, between 18 and 74 years of age, according to Statistics Sweden’s 
education register in 2006.  
  Fourthly, ‘losers of modernity’ generally have low-skilled, and most of the time, low-paid 
jobs. People with lower incomes (often so called ‘blue collar workers’) could thus be assumed 
to be more prone to support anti-immigrant parties than high paid workers (cf. Gilljam & 
Holmberg 1993: 203). The share of the population with low incomes is therefore included in 
the model. The variable is operationalized as the percentage of the population from 18 years 
in the first income quintile, according to Statistics Sweden’s income- and taxation register of 
the year 2005.  
  Fifthly, the share of unemployment is also an obvious ‘usual suspect’ in the demand-oriented 
literature. Even though previous research is unclear about the effect of unemployment (cf. 
Arzheimer & Carter 2006), Kestilä and Söderlund (2007) find conclusive evidence that 
unemployment indeed fosters a demand for anti-immigrant parties. Accordingly, this variable 
– based on data from Swedish statistics from 2006 – finds a place in our model. 
 
Theoretically, then, higher rates of unemployment, foreign-born persons, low-income earners 
and reported crimes would be expected to increase the probability for SD to gain council 
representation. If we look at these control variables, four of them are expected to have 
positive effects. However, a larger share of highly educated people would, according to 
previous research, give a lower probability for SD reaching municipal councils. Our own 
theoretical argument does, however, maintain that SD running with a formal ballot will have a 
strong effect even when these variables are controlled for. What we now want to see is how 
our own proposed argument fairs when the ‘usual suspects’ identified in previous studies 
are controlled for. 
   15 
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Log Likelihood   -138.63     
Pseudo-R2  0.31     
N  290     
Note: * Significant at the 0.1 level, ** significant at the 0.05 level, ***significant at the 0.01 level. Parameter 
estimates are unstandardized logit coefficients. Entries in parentheses are standard errors. Changes in probability 
are the estimates of the discrete changes in probability for SD receiving representation when an independent 
variable changes from its empirical minimum to its empirical maximum while all other independent variables are 
held constant at their mean. The 95 % confidence interval concerns the estimates of changes in probability. Odds 




The results of the statistical model are presented in table 1.13 The effects of the independent 
variables are presented as coefficients and changes in probability (associated odds ratios are 
presented in the note to table 1). 14 A positive coefficient means that a higher value of the 
independent variable leads to higher probability of the outcome, i.e. that SD receives 
representation. In the table, we also present estimates of the discrete changes in probability 
for SD receiving representation when an independent variable changes from its empirical 
minimum to its empirical maximum, while all other independent variables are held constant 
                                                 
12 To check if there is a problem with multicollinearity, we have estimated the Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF). The VIF ranges between 1.2 and 2.2 for the different independent variables. There is no 
consensus for when the VIF is too high. However, a common rule of thumb is that if VIF is below 5 
(some have proposed 10), no serious problem with multicollinearity exists. Our estimated VIF is well 
below that threshold. 
13 Descriptive statistics for the independent variables are found in table 3 in the appendix. 
14 An odds ratio above 1 means a positive effect, and below 1 means a negative effect on the outcome.   16 
at their mean. These estimates are of course theoretical constructions that in some cases 
could seem a bit far-fetched (e.g. it is not likely that the share of highly educated would 
change from the empirical minimum to the empirical maximum without affecting the share 
with low incomes). Still, the estimates of discrete changes in probability will hopefully help 
to shed some light on the potential magnitude of the variables included in the model. 
 
The model lends support to the supply-oriented argument i.e. that running with a formal 
ballot raises the probability for the SD to obtain council representation. If all other 
independent variables are kept constant at their mean levels, the probability that the SD 
gains council representation increases from 21 to 84 percent if they run for election with a 
formal ballot. In other words, as table 1 demonstrates, the model estimates an increase in the 
probability by 63 percentage points when the party ran with a formal ballot. Thus, even 
when local contextual socio-economic variables are controlled for, the effect of SD running 
with a formal ballot has a substantial effect on their probability to gain representation.15 The 
associated odds ratio (presented in the note to table 1) is 19.8. This means that the odds for 
the SD of getting representation are almost 20 times bigger if it runs for election with a 
formal ballot compared to if it does not.16  
 
With one exception, all other variables have estimated effects in the expected direction. The 
model indicates that larger proportions of non-Nordic residents increase the probability for 
SD to gain representation. However, the effect is far from significant. The number of 
reported crimes and the share of the population with low incomes seem to have a positive 
effect on the likelihood of SD gaining representation. The changes in probability are quite 
big, but both effects are only significant at the 0.1 level. The effect of unemployment is, 
however, not in the expected direction. Our model indicates a relationship in the opposite 
direction. In fact, the model indicates that a higher rate of unemployment has a negative 
effect on the probability of SD receiving representation.  
 
                                                 
15 As mentioned earlier, the SD received representation in 79 percent of the municipalities where they 
ran with a formal ballot and in 25 percent of the other municipalities, i.e. a discrete change in 
probability of approximately 54 percentage points. 
16 Another way to examine if there is something to our theoretical argument is to see whether or not 
running with a formal ballot in local elections also increases the support for the SD in the 2006 national 
elections. Table 4 in the appendix presents such a model. Indeed, it turns out that running with a 
formal ballot locally strengthens the support for the SD even in parliamentary election. This lends 
further support to our basic argument, that supply, i.e. party entrepreneurs and/or local activists 
should not be neglected when trying to explain the success for new political parties.   17 
In line with results from previous research, the percentage with post-secondary education 
has a clearly significant effect on whether the SD gained representation or not (even at the 
0.01 level). It appears as the higher the share of people with educational attainment in the 
population, the less likely it is that the SD gains representation in municipal councils. The 
model estimates that changing the percentage with higher education from the empirical 
minimum to the empirical maximum decreases the probability by 74 percentage points, 
when all other independent variables are kept at their mean. Although this indicates a strong 
effect, it should be noted that a change from the empirical minimum to the empirical 
maximum is an enormous change. In this case it refers to an increase of the percentage with 
higher education from 14 to 63 percent. It is thus difficult to compare the effect of SD running 
with a formal ballot with the effect of higher education in the population. This is partly due 
to that one of these variables is dichotomous whereas the other is continuous. Nevertheless, 
figure 1 illustrates the effect of these two variables on the probability of SD receiving 
representation, and the relationship between them. 
 
Figure 1. Probability of the SD obtaining representation by percentage with post-secondary education and if the 
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Comment: the probability is predicted using the model presented in table 1 and keeping all other variables 
constant at their mean. 
 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the effects of education, and running with a formal ballot simultaneously, 
while keeping all other independent variables at their mean. The mean value of the   18 
education variable is 24 percent. Around that value the effect of SD running with a formal 
ballot is profound, as mentioned earlier. Furthermore, in 90 percent of the municipalities the 
percentage with higher education is less than 35 percent, i.e. they are in the left hand side of 




The thrust in the argument we have presented here is that previous research on the 
emergence and success of new parties has underestimated the role of activists, campaigners, 
organizers and agitators in the initial electoral success of new parties (cf. Anheier 2003; 
Hedström et al 2000). To demonstrate this, we analysed a surprising empirical development 
in one of the worlds’ most stable party systems, the Swedish one where the anti-immigrant 
Swedish Democrats made sudden breakthrough in the 2006 election and obtained 
representation in 144 out of 290 municipalities. 
 
To test if there is anything to our argument, we maintained that an important, yet 
overlooked factor, in explaining the SD breakthrough, is whether or not they ran with a 
formal ballot, regardless of any socioeconomic local prerequisites. It turned out that our 
argument fares well. The party gained representation in 79 percent of the 132 municipalities 
where they ran with a formal ballot. Even when relevant demand-oriented, socioeconomic 
variables (i.e. income-levels, employment rates, education-levels, non-Nordic residents, 
crime-rates) were controlled for, the effect of running with a formal ballot is still an 
important explanatory factor. We maintain that these results are found because formal 
ballots not only are (i) a crucial signal to the voters that there de facto are physical SD 
candidates ready to take place in local councils in the municipality, but also (ii) a proxy for 
whether or not the SD had a formal organization in place campaigning and articulating the 
anti-immigrant program.  
 
But what does our result really say? Isn’t it borderline-tautological to state that running with 
a formal ballot will increase the chances for representation? Our answer is negative. We 
maintain that the ramifications of our proposed argument, and the results supporting it, are 
much more important than one might believe at first glance. To be precise, it implies that 
public commentators, and many social scientists that have had opinions in this matter, may   19 
have underestimated the true potential of anti-immigrant programs in Sweden. Bear in mind 
that the SD only ran with formal ballots in 132 of Sweden’s 290 municipalities. We argue that 
running with a formal ballot is a crucial signal to the voters that there is a local supply of 
physical SD candidates, and it can also be viewed as a proxy for the local presence of local 
campaigning and anti-immigrant policy articulation. At the time of the 2006 election, the 
formal supply of SD programs and local campaigning was only present in less than half of 
the municipalities. Given our results, there seems to lay some grain of truth in the suspicion 
that demand for anti-immigrant politics may have exceeded the de facto supply of them.  
 
To make a simple calculation, based on the assumption that supply of SD formal ballots is 
more important than socioeconomic factors, and that the SD actually would have had the 
organizational power to supply formal ballots in all of them, SD might have gained 
representation in ca 230 municipalities rather than the 144.17 Our argument that supply (e.g. 
formal ballots) matters for success therefore says something crucial about (a) the importance 
of local political activists that locally organize, pack and present real political alternatives for 
the electorate to actually vote for, and (b) that the voters that are attracted by SD politics may 
not be so socioeconomically marginalized and politically extreme as suggested by previous 
research. 18 
 
A few words of caution. There are two objections that that we haven’t been able to engage 
with sufficiently in this article. Firstly, a representative for the failure of established parties-
perspective could ask if we really can take the failure of established parties for granted as a 
necessary condition for new party-success. What if there is a substantial local variation 
between the Swedish municipalities in the way established parties (a) manage their 
mandates, (b) handle the public resources, and (b) manoeuvre the threats posed by local, 
anti-immigrant parties? And what if it is actually the varying qualities of local, established 
parties to take care of these things that, when all is said and done, decide the fortunes of anti-
immigrant parties?’  
 
                                                 
17 In fact, if we assume that SD would have run with a formal ballot in all municipalities, ceteris 
paribus, the expected value of our predicted probabilities suggests that they would have received 
representation in 232 out of 290 municipalities. 
18 In fact, this is what Sannerstedt (2008) concludes in his pioneering, explorative analysis regarding 
the characteristics of the typical SD voter. SD voters are not socially marginalized: they have a rather 
good income, a gymnasium degree and are likely to be married or in a relationship. Furthermore, they 
seem to place themselves in the middle of the left-right divide.    20 
Secondly, Christopher Green-Andersen and colleagues (Green-Andersen & Krogstrup 2008; 
Green-Andersen & Odmalm 2008) have presented analyses on why immigration became an 
important political issue in Danish national politics in the 1990s, but not in Sweden. They 
explain this by saying that the different strategic situation of the mainstream right-wing 
parties in the two countries determines whether or not the immigration issue becomes 
politicized. They reason like this: Typically, a focus on the immigrant issue leads to a conflict 
within the centre-right cluster. In Sweden, a politicization of the immigrant issue would 
undermine mainstream right-wing attempts at winning government power. On the other 
hand, in Denmark, Social Liberals governed with the Social Democrats in the 1990s, and this 
configuration made it attractive for mainstream right-wing parties in Denmark to bring the 
immigration issue to the fore. Hence, they increased their chances to win government power 
based on the support of anti-immigration parties. This, in turn, paved the way for success for 
the latter parties. If this argument is transported to the Swedish local context in 2006, Green-
Pedersens argument might be that SD success depends on whether or not established centre-
right parties deliberately have tried to politicize the immigration issue in the municipalities 
where SD gained representation.  
 
Our response to these two objections is that they seem to be valid arguments. However, to 
our knowledge, there is at present no good way to reliably measure these things, i.e. the 
varying ‘failures’ of established parties between the municipalities, and whether or not 
centre-right parties have politicized the immigration issue in some municipalities but not 
others. Until someone has collected reliable data that can measure these things in the 290 
municipalities, so that these potential important factors can be included in a statistical model, 
we maintain that our supply-side argument is an important explanatory factor if we want to 
understand why the SD managed to gain their relative success in the 2006 election.  21 
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Adjusted R2  0.31 
N  290 
 
 




Mean  Standard 
deviation 
Min  Max  
(i) The SD ran with a 
formal ballot 
 
0.46  0.50  0  1 
(ii) Percent born in other 
than the Nordic 
countries 
 
6.79  4.74  1.52  36.07 
(iii) Number of reported 
crimes in 2005 
 
99.39  29.64  36.92  216.64 
(iv) Percent with post 
secondary education 
 
23.81  8.22  13.89  63.18 
(v) Percent with low 
incomes 
19.85  2.57  12.88  28.01 
(vi) Average 
unemployment in 2006 
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